Introduction 1
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has widened its competences considerably in the field of transnational surveillance. The main databases for border movements, Schengen Information System (SIS), Visa Information System (VIS), and Eurodac, are planned to merge increasingly to ensure maximum efficiency in surveillance. These databases are keeping track of movement within the EU and across its borders, mainly for the purpose of controlling migration 2 . This process of harmonising migration surveillance systems is controversial. All three databases entail large-scale surveillance of migrants and travellers thereby turning every recorded individual into a potential suspect. As the European Data Protection
Supervisor stated, "all travellers are put under surveillance and are considered a priori as potential law breakers" (Bunyan, 2008) .
David Lyon (2003) , the founder of surveillance studies, assesses that transnational surveillance systems classify individuals according to certain criteria that allow for discriminatory treatment. Thereby, social differences are created and stored, which he labels social sorting. Social sorting, in other words, refers to surveillance systems obtaining data for the purpose of classifying people according to specific criteria. Classification occurs according to risk categories such as citizens, migrants or potential criminals.
This may lead to establishing or strengthening social differences. Starting out from Lyon's assumption that every form of surveillance entails social sorting, this paper assesses in how far and with what consequences such classification is found in present-day EU surveillance systems. If they display social sorting characteristics to a high degree, this indicates that the traditional function of borders of exclusion and inclusion of migrants is to some extent taken over by the new surveillance systems. The question then arises how this form of social sorting affects the concept of the border in the EU. The intended merger of transnational databases will create an increasingly sophisticated information infrastructure that may alter the function of territorial boundaries. If border surveillance is no longer confined to checking documents "on the ground" but is carried out "in the cloud", what does this entail for the concept of the territorial border?
To put it differently, this paper claims that the EU surveillance databases exhibit social sorting, directly affecting the classified individuals.
This changes the notion of the European border since the power to divide into in-and outsiders of society is shifted from territorial boundaries towards socio-digital borders that are determined by the emerging digital infrastructure. I argue that, to a certain extent, borders are redrawn along the categories established through social sorting.
This paper starts out from definitions of surveillance provided by different authors to establish the features of modern surveillance. Bendrath This paper firstly gives an overview over the concepts of surveillance and social sorting. It then introduces SIS, VIS and Eurodac and gives concise information on the purpose and the functioning of the systems. Thereafter, I
assess the three systems according to the criteria of social sorting identified in section 2. The paper finishes with a discussion of the concepts of territorial and socio-digital borders.
Theoretical Framework -Surveillance as Social Sorting
Triggered by the revelations about surveillance techniques of secret services, large-scale surveillance has recently become the topic of public debate in Europe, North America and elsewhere (Weidemann, 2014, p.3 Lyon (2007) adds fundamental insights to the notion of surveillance.
He spots an increase in routine population surveillance after 9/11 (p.161).
Through modern identification technologies such as airport screening, surveillance has become a feature of everyday life (2003, p.13) .
Additionally, the technological revolution has resulted in an increased reliance of surveillance on searchable databases. Since 9/11, the purpose of collected data has been to predict and prevent threats to security by classifying and assessing the risk of data. Hence, surveillance is increasingly designed to precede the event rather than to be used to assess events in retrospective (p.14). Following these definitions, this paper looks at modern surveillance as being automated, remote, routine, entailing data sharing and being used to prevent threats.
The most fundamental change Lyon perceives in post-9/11 surveillance is that information systems increasingly show patterns of social sorting. Social sorting systems obtain personal and group data to classify people according to specific criteria. To Lyon, modern surveillance always entails a classification of people into risk categories. Data created through digital surveillance needs to be processed, analysed and stored in an efficient way to be suitable for decision-making. Social sorting systems constantly verify identities, assess the risks stemming from individual data, and assign a degree of salience to them. People's data and, thus, the people themselves, are put into social categories according to criteria set out within the surveillance system. Lyon understands such systems of risk management as a means of creating and reinforcing long-term social differences (Lyon, 2003, pp.22-24) .
The phenomenon of social sorting usually gains strength when security arrangements and biometric identification systems are internationally harmonised. The international dimension is important since movements on both sides of the border are monitored which enables a broad scope of border surveillance and increases its efficiency. The introduction of biometric passports represents such a surveillance system that has been harmonised and shows evident patterns of social sorting (Lyon, 2007, pp.162-163) .
Moreover, the US-Canadian Smart Border programme entails cross-border surveillance and information sharing. This exemplifies the trend of policymakers towards using interoperable databases to increase border security (p.165).
The classification occurs with the rationale of risk management, i.e.
translating the data into risk categories for decision-making. The groups that such systems usually target are, firstly, mobile citizens and travellers, secondly, migrants and asylum seekers and, thirdly, criminals (Lyon, 2007, p.163) . Among the most suspicious categories are presumed terrorists and irregular migrants. This distinction and hierarchy of risk categories reflect Foucault's concept of descending individualisation. The groups at the lower end of the social hierarchy are surveilled more than the ones at the upper end (Foucault, 1977, p.193) .
The concept of social sorting relies on computer codes central to the systems. Each category and individual is assigned a specific code that becomes more significant the more information is added (Lyon, 2003, p.23) . Although the initial categories are the result of political decisionmaking, the classification that surveillance systems produce, give rise to further assessment. The systems subsequently determine who should be target of special treatment, suspicion, inclusion or exclusion (Lyon, 2004, p.20) . For the people put in undesirable categories social sorting directly influences the quality of their lives and determines their chances and choices in society (Lyon, 2007, p.162; 2003, p.20) . Whether a border surveillance system puts a person in the category of a legitimate traveller or in that of an illegitimate migrant is decisive for one's personal freedom of movement.
Such systems thus have a considerable impact on social exclusion and inclusion, and raise concerns about human rights and civil liberties (Lyon, 2007, pp.162-163) . Being meant to facilitate decisions on exclusion and inclusion, social sorting systems likewise raise questions about border politics. Dividing into in-and outsiders is traditionally the task of territorial borders. States are becoming increasingly aware of the limits for population control that the place-bound border checkpoints entail. Therefore, social sorting systems are used to create a digital infrastructure that detaches To sum up, social sorting relies on large-scale databases, is based on classification and can have dramatic effects. Let us take a closer look at these three elements. Firstly, social sorting tends to grow with the transnational harmonisation of security arrangements, such as border management programmes. These programmes are commonly intended to be interoperable with existing databases to ensure maximum security control.
The system relies on computer codes that target either individuals or a group of people. Furthermore, social sorting systems are usually designed to be systems of risk management, assessing the worth and the risk of the entered data. In addition, they rely on biometric data to make identification more concrete and reliable. Secondly, on the basis of the collected data social sorting systems assign people to different risk categories. This is done according to specific criteria that are based on attributes of identification such as nationality and purpose of travel. Thirdly, categorisation has real social effects on the classified people. The established categories allow for discriminatory treatment. They decide on exclusion or inclusion and thereby create long-term social differences or reinforce already existing unequal patterns. These characteristics are summarised in Table 1 and are applied to the EU migration surveillance systems in the analysis that follows. By taking a closer look at the design of the systems, I intend to find out in how far the characteristics of social sorting described above can be found. 
Surveilling Migration Transnationally: SIS, VIS and Eurodac
In order to keep pace with increasing migration, the EU has assigned more importance to the role of transnational surveillance systems for controlling border movements (Aas, 2011, p.333 p.77). Once a "hit" has been found, that is the correspondence with a stored data set, the asylum applicant may be returned to the member state where the first asylum claim was issued.
Since the three systems are all managed by the EU agency eu-LISA, Table 1 are applied to the databases. In order to answer the question of the effect of social sorting systems on the concept of the border in the EU, a conceptual discussion is held thereafter.
Building on secondary literature on border studies, the discussion elaborates the concept of socio-digital borders to define the observed phenomenon and thereby adds new insights to the research field.
Policy Document Analysis: Social Sorting in SIS, VIS and Eurodac
In the following, I conduct a policy document analysis of the founding regulations of the three systems applying the criteria set out in Table 1 .
The Databases
With respect to the nature of the databases, let us first look at the degree of harmonisation of international security arrangements with the databases. To determine whether the databases represent risk management systems, attention is paid to their purpose. Systems of risk management assign worth and risk to the collected data which enables judgement. The analysis reveals that the cases fulfil this criterion to a high degree. SIS uses the collected data primarily for decision-making on border movements. The system interprets issued alerts "for the purpose of refusing entry or stay" Finally, the use of biometric data can be identified in all systems. They make use of biometric data, especially of fingerprints and biometric photos (EP & Council, 2006, p.5; 2008, p.61; 2013, p. 2).
SIS, VIS and
In conclusion, all identified criteria of social sorting with respect to databases can be confirmed when analysing the regulations of the concerned systems. Thus, with respect to these technological aspects, SIS, VIS and Eurodac display characteristics of social sorting to a large extent.
Classification
In addition to the criteria for the databases, indicators of classification are found in the examined cases. Firstly, I examine whether the systems exhibit risk categories according to which data is sorted. In general, all three databases seem to make a distinction between citizens and non-citizens, a dichotomy typical for social sorting. Examining the SIS documents, a clear distinction between third-country nationals and citizens is found. Alerts are only issued on third-country nationals for the purpose of refusing entry or stay. This holds also for third-country nationals that enjoy the right of free movement within the Schengen area (EP & Council, 2006, Art.3(d) ). Once citizenship is acquired, all data on the concerned individual is deleted, which implies that "citizen" is not counted as a risk category by the system (Art.30). Furthermore, with respect to SIS' task of enhancing security, data is classified according to the categories "persons wanted for arrest", "missing persons", "persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure" and "persons for discreet or specific checks" (Council, 2007, Chapters V-VIII) . Since VIS focuses on the issuance of visas, it does not classify into citizens and non-citizens but distinguishes between tourists and illegitimate visa holders. It is a spelled-out purpose of VIS to protect travellers (European Commission, 2015) . Hence, every case not classified as a tourist or a similar category is considered a category of risk. Eurodac establishes three categories of risk according to differing attributes of "aliens". Being concerned with asylum applications, the system distinguishes between "applicants for international protection", "third-country nationals or stateless persons apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border" and "third- origin, the reference number and the biometric data gained through the fingerprints (2013, Art.14). Hence, it seems that for all systems, the biometric data and the country of origin plays a crucial role in determining the categories' attributes since these characteristics are spelled out most clearly.
In conclusion, the examined systems all display strong characteristics of classification into different groups with distinguishable characteristics.
Although the categories' characteristics are not formulated precisely enough, it can be stated that SIS, VIS and Eurodac exhibit this vital criterion of social sorting to a large extent.
The Social Effects of Classification
The final group of criteria concerning the social effects of classification is difficult to determine, since, not surprisingly, the examined policy documents do not mention the social implications they may have on the categorised individuals. However, the regulations still allow for some statements about these effects.
Firstly, since the identified categories are the result of and form the basis for decision-making, they allow for discriminatory treatment along the lines of the data groups. These decisions concerning every categorised individual can have serious social implications for them. SIS categorises to refuse entry or stay within the Schengen area (EP & Council, 2006, p.5) .
This implies that the category one is put into has a direct effect on freedom of mobility within the EU. With SIS being also used as a security instrument, Europol and Interpol can be granted access to the system. Hence, members of a risk category are more likely to be persecuted and suspected for criminal offences than non-surveilled persons. The same holds for Eurodac, whose files may also be object of Europol investigations (2013, Art.21). VIS equally indicates possible social implications. Aiming at the prevention of asylum shopping and the regulation of visa applications, the risk category affects the applicants' prospects of success of being granted a visa. In addition, VIS information is linked to the profiles of the travel groups or family members of every individual (2008, Art.8). Hence, if an alert is issued on one member of this "network", other members are automatically controlled, too. Thus, an alert affects more than only the concerned file.
It can be assumed that such discriminatory treatment with respect to freedom of mobility or freedom from suspicion results in long-term social differences. With respect to social differences being maintained in the long term, the systems provide for permanent and repetitive control of the data file. This is done since in particular VIS is not only concerned with the decision on visas but also on the expiration of lawfully acquired visas. To this end, a constant re-checking of the biometric file is done (Broeders, 2007, p.73) . Moreover, data on individuals is kept in SIS and Eurodac for ten years and in VIS for five years from the date of registration onwards. This long time span suggests that the systems indeed exert influence on the A commonality of all systems is the aim of exclusion of migrants from society. SIS, VIS and Eurodac form a digital infrastructure that seeks to control institutions and networks irregular migrants need for their daily life.
Through the increasing necessity of identification and registration, the supply of employment or housing becomes more difficult and irregular supporting networks are delegitimised (Broeders, 2007, pp.74-75) . Registration and documentation have become prime tools for the "panopticon Europe" to separate the insiders from the outsiders (p.74). These negative implications happen without closer attention of policy-makers to the basic rights and freedoms of these persons which raises increasing concern among civil rights activists and non-governmental organisations (Brouwer, 2008, p. 3). The border as a territorial demarcation is a Western European invention of the 19th century, a manifestation that is paradoxically now being challenged the most in Europe through Schengen (O'Dowd, 2002, p.15; Rumford, 2006, p.164) . The traditional function of territorial borders can be defined as the demarcation of power over the territory of a state against that of another state (Kleinschmidt, 2014) . They serve to distinguish cultural or political features towards others and enable the assignment of competences and responsibilities. The post-war reconstruction of European states and territorial borders has termed the European understanding of border control involving modern competences such as surveillance or welfare (O'Dowd, 2002, p.15) . For instance, the principles of the inclusive welfare state depend on a territorial demarcation defining who is an insider to the welfare system, contributing and benefiting from it (ibid.). In this sense, borders are instruments of both exclusion and inclusion (p.32).
With Europe having less internal border control, a security deficit and loss of control over population flows have been perceived by political elites (Zaiotti, 2011, p.2) . These concerns led to the introduction of a rebordering process against non-EU citizens, a phenmenon Rumford (2006) This is not to say that territorial borders have ceased to matter. They still exist and exert important functions in population control. However, they have become multiplied and extended through social sorting systems to overcome their own limits.
I argue that, in addition to the territorial borders, a new kind of border has emerged which I label "socio-digital border". This term is chosen because it brings together the social purpose of classification and rebordering, and the digital and biometric means by which this is done. The social aspect of the term refers to the lines along which borders are drawn such as the risk category one is put into, one's origin or the purpose of travel. The digital aspect refers to the methods through which social sorting and discriminatory decision-making are facilitated, including biometrics or digital surveillance. It also refers to the non-visibility of the border which is achieved through its digitalisation and which represents a contrast to the visible territorial border.
Other authors have termed this new border differently. Amoore (2006) labels it "biometric border" referring to biometric technology that identifies mobile bodies and can be understood as a frontier that is produced through the specification of sameness and difference (p.344). With the same rationale, Walters (2002) uses the term "biopolitical border" combining the biometric nature of the border with the political power that is exercised through it (p.571). However, this focus on biometrics is not sufficient to describe the phenomenon observed in this study. Although biometrics are important in the rebordering process, it is not the biometric data that determines the border but the criteria that the system has set out to classify. Furthermore, the term biometric neglects the digital and coded character of the surveillance systems. Additionally, it is important to pay equal attention to the social component of the new border that determines the content of the dividing border line. After all, the digital biometric border merely enables the reproduction of social borders. Technology supports the rebordering process but the new border is based on social factors. Therefore, the term "socio-digital border" as a designation of the observed phenomenon is useful as it combines the social aspects of bordering with the digital and invisible nature of the border.
Modern surveillance systems such as SIS, VIS and Eurodac have assumed significant bordering functions. Physical borders are no longer the only place where being counted as an in-or outsider becomes possible.
Technology has enabled such borders to be possibly reproduced everywhere.
The coding of identities and the thereby possible permanent manifestation of legitimacy results in such an omni-present border (Lyon, 2004, p.2) .
Wherever biometrically registered and checked bodies can be found, the border is carried into society. As Amoore (2006) puts it, "the border becomes a condition of being that is always in the act of becoming, it is never entirely crossed, but appears instead as a constant demand for proof of status and legitimacy" (p.348). The establishment and possibility of a verifiable identity at the socio-digital border has, hence, become a condition of being.
Conclusion
This study of document analysis and conceptual discussion shows that social sorting in EU border and migration surveillance systems impacts the concept of the border in Europe. The study shows how the surveillance systems SIS, VIS and Eurodac exhibit features of social sorting according to the Lyon's definition. The systems do not only provide for categories of citizens, travellers, migrants or terrorists but also set out specific criteria according to which individuals are classified. Moreover, they rely on modern technologies such as biometrics or large-scale databases and therefore have a considerable scope and efficiency. The policy document analysis hence shows that social sorting is found to a large extent in the examined systems.
The analysis suggests that the systems have taken over functions of population control, a task that is traditionally assigned to territorial borders.
The conceptual discussion assesses that, therefore, social sorting systems 
